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Abstract. Structured P2P networks have proven to be effective in the
exchange of data between nodes whose identity and content are generally
indexed in a DHT. For years, such DHT networks have allowed, among
other users, third world inhabitants, such as African people, to exchange
information among them and with the rest of the world without relying
on a centralized infrastructure. Unfortunately, more than ever, reliability
of communication across the Internet is threatened by various attacks,
including usurpation of identity, eavesdropping or traffic modification.
Thus, in order to overcome these security issues and allow peers to se-
curely exchange data, we propose a new key management scheme that
enables to handle public keys in the absence of a central coordination
which would be required in a traditional PKI.
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1 Introduction
Opportunities of development are countless in a connected world. Unfortunately,
participating to the information society remains a challenging endeavour for de-
veloping countries whose priorities lie elsewhere. Indeed, the lack of health care
centers, schools, and practicable roads has pressing and damaging impact on
the communities, outranking the need for investing in telecommunication infras-
tructures. In such contexts, opportunistic networking remains a prime choice to
provide affordable means for sharing data, exchanging information and attempt-
ing to keep in touch with the rest of the world through internet [14].
Opportunistic networks are ideal for infrastructure-poor areas, where, con-
trary to traditional networking (1) all nodes of the network are not deployed
together, (2) the size of the network cannot be approximately predicted, and
(3) even the locations of the nodes are not pre-designed [10]. They constitute
a special category of P2P networks where peers cannot rely on an ‘observing’
and ‘mighty’ central infrastructure whose existence is paramount. Instead, most
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implementations of P2P networks rely on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) that
provides a lookup service that each node in the network can use to map a given
key with its corresponding value. Maintenance of the database of key/value map-
pings is obviously distributed among the nodes so as to avoid the use of a single
point of failure that a central infrastructure would represent. Previous work has
shown that it was possible to make DHTs scalable and reliable [16, 23]. Con-
sequently, in the absence of a central infrastructure, structured P2P networks
can still benefit from the properties of DHTs to allow scalable interaction among
connected nodes. Nonetheless, in the context of such setups, security and privacy
remains challenging to implement and maintain.
Without guarantee of provision of a central infrastructure, P2P networks
are bound to face security and reliability issues that existing common policies
and techniques fail to take into account in their implementations. For example,
standard securization measures for communication involve the use of key-based
encryption which is often implemented with public-key cryptography. However,
a central problem with the use of such type of cryptography lies in confidence
that a given public key is authentic, i.e., that it is correct and belongs to the
entity claimed, that it has not been tampered with or that is has not been
replaced by a malicious third party. Usually, this confidence is guaranteed by
a central Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), in which one or several certificate
authorities certify ownership of key pairs. There is therefore a requirement for a
strong centralization to manage cryptography keys, a luxury that P2P networks
cannot practically afford [24].
We propose in this paper to take into account the specificities of P2P net-
works and the security and reliability requirements for exchanging information in
this era, to design a new approach for the management of public keys. Contrary
to the traditionnal PKI, the management of public keys in our scheme is decen-
tralized. Indeed, this management is distribued among the peers that form the
P2P system. In practice, we rely on the “hyperbolic plane”-based topology where
each node can select his parent accordingly in a distributed process. Public keys
can then be forwarded safely for use by peers to ensure communication security.
In previous work [1], we have proposed an approach to address the security is-
sues of the communication sessions when users are mobile across the network of
nodes. This approach targetting user-level applications is complementary to the
approach developed in this paper which targets the security of the underlying
network nodes.
The main contributions of this paper are:
– We first discuss the opportunities of P2P networks for developing regions:
where and how they can be harnessed to deliver connectivity in a truely bene-
ficial way. We then discuss the challenges that arise in such networks, focusing
on the safety and reliability of communications.
– We then discuss the challenges for implementing authentication of sources in
a P2P network. We emphasize on why traditional PKI which are currently
successful on the Internet appear to be inadequate for P2P systems.
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– We detail our approach for distributing the management of public keys across
the different nodes. The novelty of this approach is that it leverages existing
principles in a state-of-the art topology, to provide a reliable and secure way
to manage public keys.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses P2P
networking in the context of African developing regions. Section 3 enumerates
the challenges that must be overcome to secure communications in P2P networks.
Section 4.2 presents our approach. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7
concludes.
2 P2P and developing areas
The network environment in developing regions, in particular Africa, is chal-
lenged. Networks in such areas are often characterized by frequent, lengthy, and
unpredictable link outages, as well as congested usage of an already limited band-
width [4]. A recent comparison of bandwidth available and its costs in developed
and developing regions showed that the discrepancy reaches an order of mag-
nitude. Saif et al. have reported that while a 2 Mbps ADSL link in the United
States costs around US$40/month, a 2 Mbps broadband connection in Pakistan
costs close to US$400/month [18]. Mainly three reasons explain such differences:
(1) the cost of incoming bandwidth on links between developed and developing
countries; (2) the lack of performant and adequate ISPs at the right scale; and
(3) inadequate provisionning for “pre-paid” users who account for most internet
users but whose base is harder to anticipate.
To address these issues, researchers and practitionners have relied on al-
ternative paradigms involving Delay Tolerant Networks [4] and Opportunistic
Networks [10, 11, 14, 15] which appeared to suit the requirements of developing
regions. In this context, Peer-to-peer systems have been proposed to support the
enhancement of connectivity across developing areas. Researchers have thus pro-
posed to apply P2P technologies to networking needs that are more urgent than
simple (and often illegal ?) file sharing. For instance, P2P was found suitable for
oﬄine internet access [17,19].
3 Challenges
Securing communication in P2P networks is a challenging endeavor, especially
with regards to the standard practice of crypting information. In this section,
we precisely detail some obvious and non-obvious challenges to highlight the
constraints of finding a solution for P2P systems.
Key distribution. The first challenge that we encounter is the mode of distribut-
ing cryptographic keys in infrastructure-poor or infrastructure-less areas. Indeed,
traditionally, a management-friendly central infrastructure, called PKI, is relied
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upon for this task. In absence of infrastructure we propose a fully distributed
approach to spread keys. To this end, we benefit from the distributed features
of existing “hyperbolic plane” overlay networks, in particular self-organization.
Use of alternate infrastructure. Relying on the hyperbolic tree to assure the
forwarding of cryptographic keys also comes with problems that traditional PKI
was able to easily handled. Indeed, there is a new need to ensure in a distributed
system that the construction of the overlay network where each peer is prop-
erly identified will guarantee the robustness of the exchange scenario with little
possibility of corruption by any intermediate peer.
Exchange of keys When initiating a communication in a P2P network, there
will be a need for the peers to agree on the generation of a session key that
the two peers will shared. A challenge in this requirement lies in the negotiation
which should also be secured. Since usage of cryptography asymmetric algorithm
to secure information is expensive, we propose to only rely on it in the key
negotiation phase.
Detection of attacks The last but note least issue is to provide a mechanism
for detecting corrupted keys. Indeed, when a corrupted cryptographic key is
detected, it should be revoked by peers who are aware of the corruption. The
information must also be broadcasted in the network through a notification
message that should assure that all corrupted keys are flushed out of the memory
of connected peers. Similarly, a challenging endeavor will be to prevent the Man-
in-the-middle attacks during session key negotiation phase
4 System Design
In this section we discuss the different roadmaps that could be used to secure
communications in P2P networks. We then detail our approach and the involved
algorithms and heuristics.
4.1 Roadmap
In the absence of the traditional PKI for a central management of public keys,
different schemes have been implemented to allow two peers to share a key (i.e., a
secret) in a reliable way. We propose to go over those methods so as to highlight
their limitations. We build our approach on top of these schemes, aiming at
adressing with a DHT the different issues that we encounter in them:
• Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [5]
The DH protocol is a strong cryptographic algorithm that enables sharing a
secret between two nodes. Indeed, the proposed key exchange method allows
two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish
a shared secret. The strong point of the algorithm proposed by Diffie and
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Hellman also lies in the fact that the key exchange can be performed over
an insecure communication channel. This protocol has been demonstrated to
be secure against eavesdropping, and an extended version of the DH protocol
has been implemented by Steiner et al. to share a secret in a group of n
participating nodes [21].
Unfortunately, the DH scheme has been demonstrated to be opened to Man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, a category of attacks that should be ruled out
in P2P networks.
• DH-based multipath key exchange method [22]
To address the MITM attacks with the DH protocol, Takano et al. have pro-
posed a multipath key exchange scheme that enables to forward different
components of an encryption key through separate paths, in order to pre-
vent MITM attacks. Their approach is focused on P2P networks using a ring
topology, such as Chord [13] and Symphony [12], and uses clockwise/anti-
clockwise routing technique. Nevertheless, despite its interesting features, this
approach still suffers a few issues:
– it is restricted to a specific category of P2P networks (Chord and Sym-
phony), and the ring topology does not appear to be realistic in the scenario
of opportunistic networking where P2P connections are ad-hoc.
– it makes various assumptions that cannot be guaranteed in a truely P2P
opportunistic network.
4.2 An enhanced multipath DH-based key management
In this section, we propose an improvment (extension) of the model designed by
Y. Takano et al. [22]. Scalable, decentralized and self-organized networks such
as DHT-based P2P systems enable many users to join them. Thus, each node
can be connected to a lot of other nodes; there can be then several paths between
two endpoints of the network. For the above reasons, network topology can be
transformed into a graph: each node represents an edge of the graph and each
link indicates a connection between two nodes. Considering that P2P networks
consist of a large number of peers that have multiple connections with several
peers, network topology could be represented by a p-connected graph.
Hyperbolic Addressing Tree. Our approach leverages previous work [3]
where the authors have demonstrated that hyperbolic geometry can be efficiently
used for characterizing the overlay in a P2P network. Figure 1 thus illustrates
the hyperbolic plane where the area is subdivided in disjoint zones allowing for
each node to be positionned in a unique way while being able to be connected
to a finite number of other nodes. This number corresponds to the degree q of
the spanning tree that is thus built.
In the hyperbolic plane, a node of the tree can independantly compute the
addresses corresponding to its children in the tree, and the degree of the tree
determines how many addresses each peer in the network will be able to give.
Thus by fixing the degree of the tree at the birth of the overlay, and by allowing
each peer to connect to any peer at any time, the network can scale. In their
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Fig. 1. A regular tree in the hyperbolic
plane where each node has a degree 3 (Image
credit: Cassagnes et al. [3])
Algorithm 1: Dispatching, at source
peer, for subkeys accross separate paths
Input: sourcePeer, listKeyComponents
Output: success / failure
degree ← getPeerDegree(sourcePeer);
list ← listKeyComponents;
if degree ≤ 0 || list = ∅ then
return failure;
foreach subKey ∈ list do
path ← selectSeparatePath();
routeSubKey(subKey, path);
return success;
work, Cassagnes et al. have proposed a distributed algorithm which ensures that
the peers are contained in distinct spaces and have unique coordinates. As the
global knowledge of the overlay is not necessary in their approach, “a new peer
can obtain coordinates simply by asking an existing peer to be its parent and to
give it an address for itself. If the asked peer has already given all its addresses,
the new peer must ask an address to another existing peer. When a new peer
obtains an address, it computes the addresses (i.e hyperbolic coordinates) of its
future children. The addressing tree is thus incrementally built at the same time
than the overlay” [3]. For more details on the creation of the addressing tree, we
refer the user to the work of Cassagnes et al. [3].
We modify the integration of a new peer to the overlay to allow :
– a more careful selection of the parents so as to allow the existence of redun-
dants paths that do not immediately interset at a parent node of a given source
node.
– a flexible construction of a P2P network that takes into account the security
priorities of each connecting peer.
In our approch explicited by Algorithm 2, since every peer can connect to
any other peer, a new peer can be forced to pick parents with specific prop-
erties when security is an important requirement for him. In our scheme, each
peer must have at least two parents when it is concerned with security issues.
Thus, while the redundant paths will allow to protect communication against
eavesdropping, a selective connection will mitigate MITM attacks. Indeed, dur-
ing the connection of a peer, each contacted potential parent will reply with the
address it offers to a child as well as the addresses of the peers to whom it is
already connected. Thus, the new peer can realise if this potential parent is also
linked to his already selected other parent. In such cases, if the new peer requires
very secure communications that will be MITM attack-proof, it must contact a
different parent.
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Algorithm 2: Attempt a connec-
tion to a parent node p
Input: p, alreadyConnectedParentAddrs
allAddrLinkedToParent
Output: newAddr
newAddr ← ⊥;
(proposedChildAddr,allAddrLinkedToParent) ←
requestAddrToParent(p);
foreach addr ∈ alreadyConnectedParentAddrs do
if ∃pa ∈ allAddrLinkedToParent | pa = addr
then
return ⊥; /* try to connect to a
different parent */
newAddr ← proposedChildAddr;
allAddrLinkedToParent ← allAddrLinkedToParent ∪ {p};
return newAddr;
Algorithm 3: Paths selection
Input: keyToTransmit, nodeNeighbours
nodeNeighbours ← sortConnectedNodes(nodeNeighbours );
keyComponents ← splitKey(keyToTransmit );
usedNode ← lastOf(nodeNeighbours );
while keyComponents 6= ∅ do
if usedNode = lastOf(nodeNeighbours ) then
usedNode ← firstOf(nodeNeighbours )
else
usedNode ← nextOf(nodeNeighbours )
component ← firstOf(keyComponents );
transmitViaSeparatePath(component, usedNode)
;
keyComponents ← keyComponents \ {component};
Key Exchange Method
Although the DH crytographic algorithm [5] has been widely used to share se-
crets on unsecure communication channels, it is MITM attacks. In order to
overcome this limitation of DH-based scenarios, we propose to use a multipath
key exchange scheme.
Building upon a scalable P2P overlay [3] which uses virtual coordinates taken
from the hyperbolic plane that is indifferent to underlying P2P network topology,
our key exchange mechanism is based on multipath key negotiation as described
in Algorithm 4. Takano et al. [22] have previously proposed a similar key negoti-
ation mechanism. However, unlike our approach, their method is restricted only
to Symphony and Chord P2P networks with a ring topology.
Algorithm 4: Key negotiation mechanism
p : a prime number
g : a generator
1. Alice selects a random number n, and computes Keya = g
n(mod p).
2. Alice selects q random numbers ka0, ..., kaq−1, such that Keya =
∑q−1
k=0 kak(mod p).
3. Alice routes all kak to Bob via q potential separate paths
1.
4. Bob receives q Keya’s components ka0, ..., kaq−1 sended by Alice and computes
Keya =
∑q−1
k=0 kak(mod p).
5. Bob selects a random number m, and computes Keyb = g
m(mod p).
6. Bob chooses q random numbers kb0, ..., kbq−1, such that Keyb =
∑q−1
k=0 kbk(mod p).
7. Bob sends all kbk to Alice via q potential separate paths
1.
8. Alice receives q Keyb’s components kb0, ..., kbq−1 from Alice and computes
Keyb =
∑q−1
k=0 kbk(mod p).
9. Alice computes Key = Keyb
n = gn·m(mod p).
10. Bob computes Key = Keya
m = gn·m(mod p).
Method for Dispatching Splitted Key Components
When a source node s is attempting to exchange a key with a destination node
d, it splits this key into several subkey components that must be dispatched
through separate channels. Algorithm 1 illustrates how the dispatching of key
components is implemented. We propose a straightforward technique to over-
come the challenge of selecting the different paths that are necessary to route
separately the each subkey towards the destination node.
1 see algorithm 1 and next section for more details on the dispatching technique
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As described previously, in the tree representing the nodes of our overlay
network, the tree degree is set and known from start, and each connected node
has a degree that may be less or equal to the tree degree. Thus, given n the tree
degree, each node wishing to forward a key must split it into n− 1 components
that will be routed in separate paths. However, the selection of paths is iterative
to account for the possibility that a few nodes may have less connections than the
maximum possible. Thus, each node numbers the different nodes it is connected
to and considers each of these nodes as the begining of a different path. Thus
when a node has a degree k, it sends the first component to its first connected
node (whether a parent or a child), and the second component to the second
connected node, and so on until all connected nodes are used, and then it comes
back to the first node to send the (n−1−k)th component. We formally describe
this path selection in Algorithm 3.
5 Security analysis
In a multipath key exchange scheme, a malicious node that wishes to compromise
a key being exchanged must be able to collect each and all subkey components
routed in the network. Formally, when paths P0, ...,Pq−1 are used to send several
distinct keys from source S to destination D, the only malicious nodes that
could compromise the key should be located at the intersection of all paths,
i.e. M = P0 ∩ ... ∩ Pq−1. S and D are obviously ignored in this set. Thus,
when P0 ∩ ... ∩ Pq−1 = {S, D} (bigon criterion is respected [6, Lemma 2.5])
then all paths are disjoint and any MITM attack attempt cannot succeed. In
such a desirable case, there exists a q-connected subgrah between S and D in
the network topology. Consequently, the probability to have a MITM attack is
estimated by σ =
|P0∩...∩Pq−1|−2
|P0∪...∪Pq−1|−2 (where each path Pi is constituted of a set of
consecutive hops from source to destination, and 2 represents the source and
destination nodes, i.e |{S}|+ |{D}|).
The number of distinct paths is dependant on the source node degree. Thus,
for a given q-regular tree, if q is a large number, then there is a very high
probalitiy to have several disjoint transmission channels. Nonetheless, despite the
robustness of our multipath negocation approach, cooperative MITM attacks,
where several nodes maliciously cooperate to compromise a key, are possible.
However, it is very hard, and excessively costly to execute such an attack in a
real environment, especially in infrastructure poor areas.
6 Related Work
Previous work have proposed to use DHT infrastructure to manage crypto-
graphic keys with more or less success and mostly with many caveats [8, 25].
Wen et al. [26] have proposed a key management mechanism for DHT networks
that transforms DHT table entries into a tree structure [7, 9]. Srivasta and Liu
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have relied on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to deliver a solution that prevents
threats in DHT networks [20]. Their scheme, however, remained sensitive to
Man-in-the-middle attacks.
Wang et al. have built a distributed PKI on top of the Chord structured
overlay network [2]. They have used threshold cryptography to distribute the
fonctionnality of the PKI across the nodes of the DHT network. This Chord-
PKI provides traditional PKI features such as certification, revocation, storage
and retrieval.
Takano et al. have proposed a Multipath Key Exchange similar to that pro-
posed in our work [22]. Their techniques however were designed to fit the Sym-
phony and Chord P2P systems and their ring topologies.
7 Conclusion
Scalable P2P networks are self-organizing, autonomous systems that accept any
peer without the need of resorting to a central coordination. Each peer alter-
natively plays the role of a router in order to relay traffic to other peers. The
flexibility of such settings thus allows them to operate effectively in infrastruc-
ture poor-areas. Unfortunately, the features that make them desirable also make
them vulnerable to eavesdropping and modification attacks.
In order to address the security challenges of P2P networks, we propose an
improvement of P2P paradigms devised in previous work [3, 23] and a new ap-
proach for key exchange that generalizes a model proposed by Takano et al. [22].
On the one hand, we can still benefit from a truly scalable P2P overlay using
hyperbolic coordinates where each node can decide on the strategy for accept-
ing a parent node depending on its security priorities. On the other hand, we
do not restrict our security scheme to a specific P2P topology, thus allowing
our approach to be implemented in any P2P setup without any organization
constraint.
In future work, we plan to implement a prototype of our system and assess
it with simulation tools as well as with real-world experiments.
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